Fenomenologia trascendentale e cognizione incarnata. La relazione tra soggetto, corpo e mondo nel quadro di un’ontologia naturale riformata

Summary

The comparison between enactivist cognitive science and classical phenomenology reveals that both perspectives emphasize the interconnectedness of subject, body, and world through action and perception. This approach challenges the traditional mind-body duality by advocating for a unified phenomenological experience. It also critiques physicalist naturalism, suggesting a weak naturalism that aligns with a transcendental viewpoint, thereby grounding subjectivity in embodied biological organisms and exploring Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This contribution offers a comparison between enactivist cognitive science and classical phenomenology, with a particular focus on key figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Two central issues are explored: the relationship between subject, body, and world, and the mediating role of action within a dynamic conception of cognition. The transcendental perspective emerging from incarnate subjectivity emphasizes the continuity between action, perception, and higher cognitive functions, challenging the mind-body duality in favor of a unified and continuous phenomenological experience. The second issue addresses physicalist naturalism and the need to move beyond mechanistic assumptions, proposing a weak naturalism that remains compatible with a transcendental perspective, one that grounds subjectivity in an embodied biological organism. An ontology of nature, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, is explored, emphasizing the qualitative aspects of the “flesh” and overcoming the limitations inherent in Husserl’s approach.

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