The paper examines the nature and location of consciousness through a physicalist lens, addressing unresolved issues in the debate on extended cognition. It highlights the ontological status of cognition and critiques the fallacy of a central cognitive location. The author proposes Mind-Object Identity (MOI) as a potential solution and compares it with other identity theories of mind.
Study at a glance
Key finding
Mind-Object Identity (MOI) is proposed as a potential solution to understanding the physical basis of consciousness.
Abstract
In this paper I approach the problem of the boundaries and location of consciousness in a strictly physicalist way. I start with the debate on extended cognition, pointing to two unresolved issues: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. I then propose using identity to single out the physical basis of consciousness. As a tentative solution, I consider Mind-Object Identity (MOI) and compare it with other identity theories of mind.