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The Hard Problem of Projected Presence Reframing Consciousness Through Organismic Stabilization

Karel Hrubec

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 8, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21264986 via OpenAlex

Summary

The paper proposes a new methodological approach to the hard problem of consciousness, suggesting that first-person immediacy should not be automatically considered foundational. It emphasizes consciousness as a biologically constrained stabilization of organismic regulation rather than an illusion or private experience. The work identifies the explanatory gap not in consciousness itself but at the transition between stabilized access and lived presence, offering a framework for future research on consciousness and related concepts.

Study at a glance

Key finding The paper locates the explanatory gap in the transition between stabilized organismic access and lived presence, rather than across consciousness as a whole.

Abstract

This conceptual paper proposes a methodological reframing of the hard problem of consciousness through the notion of projected presence. Building on the Projected Stabilization Thesis, it argues that first-person immediacy should not be granted automatic foundational authority. Consciousness is not treated as an inner observer, a private theater, or an illusion, but as the biologically constrained stabilization of organismic regulation into an access-field that becomes lived as inner presence. The paper does not claim to solve the hard problem. Instead, it locates the explanatory gap more precisely: not across consciousness as an undefined whole, but at the transition between stabilized organismic access and lived presence. It distinguishes organismic regulation, stabilized access, projected presence, selfhood, and will, while emphasizing that consciousness remains real but not methodologically immune. The framework further addresses the risk of epiphenomenalism by introducing a recurrent feedback loop in which projected presence can re-enter subsequent organismic regulation through attention, affective weighting, threat evaluation, memory, action-readiness, and correction uptake. The paper also situates the approach in relation to explanatory-gap literature, Global Workspace Theory, predictive processing, self-model theory, illusionism, and neurophenomenology. The contribution is theoretical and methodological rather than empirical. It offers a disciplined research scaffold for future work on consciousness, embodiment, agency, selfhood, and the biological conditions under which stabilized access becomes lived presence.

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