Consciousness as Projected Stabilization of the Biological Organism Selfhood, Will, and Inner Presence as Stabilized Biological Outputs
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 7, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21249016 via OpenAlex
Summary
The Projected Stabilization Thesis presents a new framework for understanding consciousness as a biologically constrained stabilization of an organism's regulation, rather than as an inner observer. It identifies three types of stabilizations: consciousness as an access-field, selfhood as an image of continuity, and will as an interpretation of direction. The concept of dogmatic immunization is introduced, highlighting a pathological form of stabilization resistant to correction. This framework aims to advance the study of consciousness and related concepts.
Study at a glance
| Design | conceptual research-program article |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The primary contribution is a coherent framework for studying consciousness, selfhood, will, and dogma as forms of corrigible or protected biological stabilization. |
Abstract
This paper introduces the Projected Stabilization Thesis, a conceptual and methodological framework for reinterpreting consciousness as a biologically constrained stabilization of organismic regulation. Rather than treating consciousness as an inner foundation, metaphysical origin, or detached observer, the paper argues that consciousness may be understood as an access-field in which bodily state, environmental orientation, temporal continuity, affective relevance, and action-readiness become available to the organism without requiring an inner observer. The paper distinguishes three coupled but non-identical stabilizations: consciousness as a stabilized access-field, selfhood as a stabilized image of organismic continuity, and will as a stabilized interpretation of organismic direction. It further develops the concept of dogmatic immunization, defined as a pathological form of stabilization in which a stabilized image becomes protected from correction despite persistent relational, bodily, empirical, or practical counter-pressure. The thesis does not claim that consciousness is unreal, illusory, reducible to computation, or equivalent to artificial intelligence. Instead, it removes the methodological immunity of first-person immediacy while preserving the biological and functional reality of conscious experience. The paper positions the framework in relation to illusionism, predictive processing, embodied cognition, higher-order theories, self-model theory, free-will skepticism, and AI analogies. It also proposes preliminary operational variables, including stabilization rigidity, correction uptake, boundary permeability, defensive immunization, reality contact, and over-correction collapse. The paper should be read as a conceptual research-program article rather than as a completed empirical theory. Its primary contribution is to provide a coherent framework for studying consciousness, selfhood, will, and dogma as forms of corrigible or protected biological stabilization.