Why Cognitive Science Needs Phenomenology: Rethinking the Epistemology of Consciousness Through Intuitive Dualism

Summary

Cognitive science can benefit from incorporating phenomenology due to the challenges posed by consciousness. The article highlights how intuitive dualism—the tendency to separate mental and physical experiences—is a common aspect of human experience. It argues that first-person experiences should be recognized as valid sources of knowledge about consciousness, which can help align scientific inquiry with lived realities. This approach aims to reconcile cognitive science with philosophical perspectives on consciousness.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT Cognitive science needs phenomenology, not despite, but because of the epistemic challenges posed by consciousness. This article argues that the pervasive presence of intuitive dualism, the empirical cognitive tendency to distinguish the mental from physical, is a widespread and entrenched feature of human experience. Drawing on work in developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology, we suggest that first‐person experience, often bracketed or marginalised in scientific accounts, must instead be treated as a legitimate source of epistemic access. The goal is in no way to return to metaphysical dualism but to recognise that the intuitively dualist subjective experience forms the data any science of consciousness must take seriously. Reframing the study of consciousness through phenomenological epistemology not only acknowledges the ontological stakes of mental phenomena but also realigns scientific inquiry with the lived realities it seeks to explain. This interdisciplinary rethinking offers a path forward for reconciling cognitive science, philosophy and the enduring puzzle of consciousness.

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