The Perceptual Sense of Agency
Review of Philosophy and Psychology November 11, 2025 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s13164-025-00788-7 via OpenAlex
Summary
The sense of agency is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. A novel account suggests that this perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is based on self-monitoring processes that compare sensory predictions from motor commands with actual sensory feedback. This comparison helps differentiate between self-caused and other-caused changes in perception. The study proposes that PSoA is modeled as an intentional mode rather than being explained by specific contents in perceptual experience.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes that compare sensory predictions with feedback. |
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Abstract
Abstract The sense of agency is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the sense of agency that appears in perceptual consciousness. I follow theorists such as Bayne and Prinz in suggesting that the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes. The self-monitoring mechanism compares sensory predictions, made on the basis of motor commands, with sensory feedback. This comparison process distinguishes self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. I argue for a view where the PSoA is not explained by certain contents represented in perceptual experience. Rather, my account models the PSoA as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. After defending this view, I respond to objections and contrast my account with others in the literature.