Experience, Dreaming, and the Phenomenology of Wakeful Consciousness

Summary

The chapter explores how wakeful consciousness contributes to our ongoing stream of consciousness, particularly by examining what is absent in non-wakeful states like dreaming. It suggests that in dreams, there is a lack of intentional mental action and non-inferential self-awareness. The author proposes a 'Capacitation Thesis' indicating that wakefulness enhances various cognitive abilities, contrasting this with the nature of imagination during dreaming.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This chapter works towards a better understanding of the contribution made by the state of wakeful consciousness to the stream of consciousness over time. It does this through reflection on what is missing in certain cases of non-wakeful consciousness. Granting the assumption that dreaming is a mode of perceptual imagination, the chapter contrasts perceptual imagination in the wakeful condition with perceptual imagination in dreaming sleep. It makes a suggestion about what is missing that draws on claims about the wakeful condition made by Brian O’Shaughnessy. According to this suggestion, what is missing is the occurrence of intentional mental action accompanied by non-inferential self-awareness. Building on a critique of O’Shaughnessy’s discussion, the chapter develops a ‘Capacitation Thesis’ about wakeful consciousness, according to which wakefulness is a state of being capacitated with respect to a range of relevant capacities. Imagination in the dream is discussed in the light of this thesis.