On the ineffability and the noetic quality of mystical experiences
Eikasía Revista de Filosofía May 11, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.57027/eikasia.136.1010 via OpenAlex
Summary
Mystical states of consciousness, as described by William James, possess a noetic quality that implies knowledge is gained through them, yet they are often ineffable. This creates an epistemological dilemma regarding how knowledge can exist without expression. Using Ludwig Wittgenstein’s framework, the study explores mystical experiences and concludes that while these experiences may have weak epistemic foundations, they hold significant pragmatic and subjective value in the religious aspect of human life.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Mystical experiences, despite their weak epistemic foundations, have important pragmatic and subjective value for religion. |
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Abstract
According to William James, mystical states of consciousness are characterized, among other features, by their noetic quality, i. e., some knowledge obtained is through them. However, another common feature of mystical experiences is their ineffability. This raises an epistemological question: How can something be known, and yet cannot be expressed? Through the conceptual framework of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, we examine mystical experiences as sources of knowledge. In Wittgenstein’s conception, the mystical is placed at a liminal and negative position: it lies outside the limits of language and of the world, and it refers to that which cannot be said. Despite the weak and problematic epistemic foundation of these experiences from Wittgenstein’s early perspective, we conclude with some reflections on their pragmatic and subjective value for the religious dimension of human life.