Is religious experience epistemologically reliable? An embodied-philosophical inquiry

Summary

The article argues that the reliability of religious experiences is better supported by an embodied cognition approach rather than a strictly cognitivistic one. It suggests that this perspective could resolve the ongoing conflict between epistemologies based on religious experiences and constructivism. Additionally, it proposes an integrative framework that reconciles these two paradigms instead of viewing them as oppositional.

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Abstract

Abstract This article critically re-examines the long-standing dominance of constructivism in debates concerning the epistemic reliability of religious experience. It argues that the epistemic reliability of such experiences can be more supported not through a strictly cognitivistic framework, but rather through an embodied approach. By interpreting religious experience from the perspective of embodied cognition, this article offers a possible resolution to the prolonged impasse between religious-experience-based epistemology and constructivism. Moreover, it proposes not merely a compatibility between the two paradigms, but the potential for an integrative framework that moves beyond their traditional opposition.

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