The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states.
Consciousness and cognition January 1, 2016 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.012 via PubMed
Summary
The concept of 'epistemic innocence' suggests that certain impaired cognitive processes can offer knowledge-related benefits. This idea, often applied to delusions, is explored in relation to the transformative effects of psychedelic drugs, challenging the view that they are purely detrimental to knowledge. Some psychedelic experiences may actually provide significant epistemic advantages, which is important for discussions about psychedelic therapy and contributes to a deeper understanding of epistemic innocence.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | Some psychedelic states can be epistemically innocent, providing significant knowledge-related benefits contrary to the view that they are fundamentally detrimental. |
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Abstract
One recent development in epistemology, the philosophical study of knowledge, is the notion of 'epistemic innocence' introduced by Bortolotti and colleagues. This concept expresses the idea that certain suboptimal cognitive processes may nonetheless have epistemic (knowledge-related) benefits. The idea that delusion or confabulation may have psychological benefits is familiar enough. What is novel and interesting is the idea that such conditions may also yield significant and otherwise unavailable epistemic benefits. I apply the notion of epistemic innocence to research on the transformative potential of psychedelic drugs. The popular epithet 'hallucinogen' exemplifies a view of these substances as fundamentally epistemically detrimental. I argue that the picture is more complicated and that some psychedelic states can be epistemically innocent. This conclusion is highly relevant to policy debates about psychedelic therapy. Moreover, analysing the case of psychedelics can shed further light on the concept of epistemic innocence itself.