Trivialisms about Explanatory Gap

Summary

The phenomenal explanatory gap—the difficulty of explaining how conscious experience arises from physical processes—may not be as unique as philosophers often assume. This paper defends a set of Trivialisms: first, a modest version holds that explanatory gaps are everywhere and the phenomenal one is not specially problematic; second, a more radical version argues from epistemic insensitivity that there are fewer reasons to posit a phenomenal gap than other gaps, such as mereological ones. The paper responds to critiques and addresses objections including metaontological deflationism and the possibility of a priori metaphysical knowledge.

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Abstract

Abstract A spectre of anti-physicalism haunts philosophy of mind: we seem unable to explain how the phenomenal arises from the physical. Rather than repeat clichés about the profundity of this explanatory gap, in this paper, I defend a set of Trivialisms, which suggest the phenomenal explanatory gap may not be as special as widely assumed. I start with surveying Schaffer’s modest Trivialism, combining anti-exceptionalism (gaps are everywhere) and the thesis of non-specialness (the phenomenal one is not uniquely special), and respond to Aleksiev’s critique. Then I develop a more radical Trivialism, arguing from epistemic insensitivity that we have fewer reasons to posit the phenomenal gap than others (e.g., mereological). Finally, I address some potential objections including those from metaontological deflationism, the possibility of a priori metaphysical knowledge, among others.

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