Mind in Nature: Enactivism as a Bridge between Transcendental Phenomenology and Aristotelian Naturalism
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy May 8, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1515/jtph-2025-0031 via OpenAlex
Summary
Rational normativity can be integrated into nature without reducing it to mere physical processes or positing a separate mental realm. Drawing on Thomas Nagel and Husserl, the article argues that reason has a transcendental status, yet rational subjects are part of the natural world. Hans Jonas’s conception of the organism and the enactive notion of operational closure provide a non-reductive, multi-level account of living organization, but enactivism remains metaphysically underdetermined.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | An Aristotelian metaphysics of life, with substantial form and formal causation, best grounds enactivism's core commitments and integrates rational normativity into nature without reduction or dualism. |
Abstract
Abstract This article examines how rational normativity can be integrated into nature without reduction or dualism. Drawing on Thomas Nagel’s critique of reductive naturalism and Husserl’s refutation of psychologism, it argues that adequate accounts of mind must respect the transcendental status of reason while also explaining how rational subjects belong to the natural world. The paper develops this problem through the philosophy of life, focusing on Hans Jonas’s conception of the organism and the enactive notion of operational closure. While enactivism offers a non-reductive, multi-level account of living organization, it remains metaphysically underdetermined. I argue that its core commitments are best understood within an Aristotelian metaphysics of life, in which substantial form and formal causation ground a realist ontology of life–mind continuity. This Aristotelian naturalism situates cognition and rationality within nature without eliminating their normative character, while phenomenological analysis remains indispensable for explicating the first-personal and normative dimensions of mind.