The Hard Problem of Intentionality for Radical Enactive Cognition

Summary

Radical Enactive Cognition attempts to ground basic intentionality, called Ur-intentionality, without mental content, using only teleofunctional resources like information-as-covariance and natural selection—a view termed Teleosemiotics. This paper argues that this approach fails. It identifies two problems for functional information-as-covariance: the Determinacy Problem and the Distality Problem. Additionally, teleofunctionalism risks reducing Ur-intentionality to stimulus-response behaviorism, which Radical Enactivism itself rejects as non-cognitive. The paper develops an enactive stimulus-response account showing teleofunctional mechanisms explain adaptive behavior without intentionality, concluding these issues pose a serious challenge—the Hard Problem of Intentionality—and suggests possible solutions.

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Abstract

Abstract Radical Enactive Cognition challenges teleosemantic representationalism while proposing a naturalistic, content-free account of basic intentionality – “Ur-intentionality” – based solely on teleofunctional resources such as information-as-covariance and natural selection, a view known as Teleosemiotics. This paper argues that this appropriation is insufficient to ground content-free intentionality. Two problems for functional information-as-covariance are identified: the Determinacy Problem and the Distality Problem. Furthermore, teleofunctionalism fails to prevent Ur-intentionality from collapsing into a form of stimulus-response behaviorism, which Radical Enactivism itself deems non-cognitive. An enactive stimulus-response account is developed to show that teleofunctional mechanisms can explain adaptive behavior without invoking intentionality. The paper concludes that these issues pose a serious and previously overlooked challenge to non-representational, selectionist theories of cognition – the Hard Problem of Intentionality – and points to possible ways to deal with the problem.

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