The exceptionality of enactivism within 4E cognition
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences February 13, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s11097-025-10131-1 via OpenAlex
Summary
This article examines whether 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) truly breaks from traditional cognitive science, which relies on computationalism, representationalism, functionalism, internalism, and realism. Most 4E theories can be assimilated into the cognitivist framework, but autopoietic enactivism—rooted in second-order cybernetics and autopoietic theory—genuinely challenges all core tenets. It reconceives cognition as emergent from dynamic, embodied interaction rather than internal symbol manipulation, resists realist commitments, and leans toward radical constructivism. Thus, only the enactive approach fully rejects traditional cognitive science's foundational assumptions.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Only autopoietic enactivism, not other 4E approaches, genuinely challenges all core tenets of mainstream cognitive science. |
Abstract
Abstract This article critically examines the theoretical landscape of 4E cognition—embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition—to assess whether it constitutes a true departure from the traditional framework in the cognitive sciences grounded in computationalism, representationalism, functionalism, internalism, and realism. While many proponents of 4E cognition claim to defend such a radical shift, I argue that only a specific strain of enactive cognition—autopoietic or autonomist enactivism—genuinely challenges all core tenets of mainstream cognitive science. Drawing on the causation-constitution dichotomy and the literature on weak versus strong variants of embodied and extended cognition, I show that most E-theories can be assimilated into the cognitivist framework when suitably qualified. By contrast, autopoietic enactivism, with its roots in second-order cybernetics and autopoietic theory, demands a deeper reconceptualization of cognition as emergent from dynamic, embodied interaction rather than internal symbol manipulation. It resists realist commitments to cognitive posits and leans toward radical constructivism, presenting a comprehensive reconceptualization of the field rather than mere theoretical elaboration. Thus, I conclude that the enactive approach remains the only strand within 4E cognition where a full rejection of the foundational assumptions of traditional cognitive science is possible.