The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.22
Summary
The epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness holds that we are ignorant of something important and relevant to the problem, which has significant implications for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of this view and considers two objections: that we are not ignorant of any feature relevant to the hard problem, and that even if true, the epistemic approach is not an answer or contribution to the problem. It concludes with reflections on why this view remains a minority position in philosophy of mind.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness is outlined and defended against two objections, but remains a minority view in contemporary philosophy of mind. |
Abstract
According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of the world, we are not ignorant of any feature that is relevant to the hard problem. The second is that, even if the epistemic approach is true, properly understood it is not an answer to the hard problem; indeed, it is no contribution to that problem at all. The chapter concludes with some brief reflections on why the epistemic approach, despite its attractiveness, remains a minority view in contemporary philosophy of mind.