Świadomość i jej intuicyjna niefizyczność
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia March 29, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.19195/1895-8001.20.2.5 via DOAJ
Summary
The intuition that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical property is a genuine epistemic problem, as psychophysical identities cannot be deduced from physical truths. Previous theories in the literature either dismiss this intuition as an illusion or misinterpret it as a cognitive issue. The article critiques these approaches and presents a new argument supporting the view that the intuition of dualism reflects a significant cognitive challenge rather than an error.
Study at a glance
| Key finding | The intuition of dualism regarding phenomenal consciousness is a genuine epistemic problem because psychophysical identities are not deducible from physical truths. |
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Abstract
Explaining the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical property is crucial in the debate on the nature of consciousness. There are two competing strategies of how to approach this issue in the literature. Some assume that the intuition of dualism is a psychological illusion, others treat this intuition as a genuine cognitive problem which is not the result of an error. This article indicates the reasons for which the proposed theories of both types are not satisfactory and in addition articulates a new argument for the claim that the intuition of dualism is a genuine epistemic problem. The source of the problem lies in the fact that psychophysical identities are not deducible from physical truths.