Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness
Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy August 1, 2024 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1093/9780198918905.003.0017
Summary
Experimental philosophy of consciousness uses empirical studies to examine how people think about conscious experiences. Researchers have claimed we lack a folk concept of consciousness, do not think entities like Microsoft feel regret, accept unfelt pains, and do not attribute conscious states to duplicated hamsters. This chapter reviews these claims and highlights the challenges of studying people's understanding of phenomenal consciousness, though it may be less daunting than studying consciousness itself.
Study at a glance
| Design | review |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Experimental philosophy of consciousness investigates and explains our thinking about phenomenally conscious states, with researchers making claims about folk concepts, entity emotions, unfelt pains, and consciousness attribution to duplicates. |
Abstract
Abstract Experimental philosophy of consciousness aims to investigate and explain our thinking about phenomenally conscious states. Based on empirical studies, researchers have argued (a) that we lack a folk concept of consciousness, (b) that we do not think entities like Microsoft feel regret, (c) that unfelt pains are widely accepted, and (d) that people do not attribute phenomenally conscious states to duplicated hamsters. In this chapter, I review these and other intriguing claims about people’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness. In doing so, I also show why experimental philosophy of consciousness is challenging, although perhaps not quite as daunting as studying phenomenal consciousness itself.