Rorty's Philosophy of Consciousness
A Companion to Rorty February 14, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1002/9781118972199.ch3 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
This essay examines why Richard Rorty endorsed physicalism despite its apparent conflict with his philosophical aims. It argues that Rorty's motivation was confused and that he failed to separate physicalism from metaphysics and scientism. The author traces the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty's position on consciousness, summarizes his Ryle-derived view, and disputes his historical claims about consciousness. Ultimately, the essay concludes that Rorty's obsession with religion led him to adopt a scientistic agenda he should have opposed.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Rorty's endorsement of physicalism was confused and failed to detach from metaphysics and scientism, driven by his obsession with religion. |
Abstract
This essay begins by asking why Rorty would endorse a physicalist agenda which, on the face of it, ran counter to his aims in philosophy; and concludes both that his motivation was confused, and that he failed to detach physicalism from metaphysics and scienticism. I begin by showing the importance of metaphilosophy to Rorty’s position on consciousness, and the centrality of consciousness to his overall project. I then summarise Rorty’s position, which was essentially derived from Ryle, but uniquely driven by metaphilosophy. My assessment begins by disputing Rorty’s thesis about the historical origins of the concept of consciousness, before following him into his favourite argumentative territory by talking about the social utility of first-person reflection on consciousness, and his own motivations for wanting to undermine such reflection. I conclude that because of his obsession with religion, Rorty became entangled in a scientistic agenda he should have opposed.