Infant color-consciousness from the higher-order perspective

Summary

Higher-order theories of consciousness are now testable empirical conjectures about phenomenal consciousness. This analysis examines what these theories imply about infant consciousness, focusing on Ned Block's argument that 6-11 month old infants have conscious color experience without color concepts. The argument does not falsify higher-order theories but raises empirical questions that could help decide between versions of the theory or whether to pursue the approach.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Higher-order theories of consciousness have gained attention as of late. This is because we are in a position where we can begin to see how we would empirically falsify these kinds of theories. I view these kinds of theories as interesting empirical conjectures about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. If they are false, it will be for empirical reasons. There has been a long debate about what these kinds of theories says about infant consciousness. Theories of consciousness should, at least in principle, be able to account for this possibility. Thus, I want to explore what the higher-order theories currently on offer have to say about this issue. For the most part I will gloss over the details of the theories, unless the details matter for the point at hand (in some cases they do). We will start by looking at what higher-order theories have said in the literature about infant consciousness up to this point. Then I will then present Ned Block’s recent (Block 2023) argument that infants in the 6-11 month range have conscious color experience but do not typically have color concepts. As we will see, this argument does not falsify higher-order theories. I will argue that it suggests future empirical questions that may help us to decide between versions of the higher-order theory or whether we should pursue that approach at all.

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