Conscious and nonconscious thought: Insights from the neuroscience of decision-making
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences May 26, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2601239123 via OpenAlex
Summary
Conscious thought does not require a special brain mechanism; it arises when nonconscious decision processes are reformatted for potential communication to oneself or others. Nonconscious thoughts are interrogations that produce provisional intentions, relying on persistent neural representations that encode both potential actions and the questions giving them meaning. Conscious thought emerges when these states are structured for report, recruiting theory of mind and narrative. This places part of the hard problem of consciousness within empirical reach.
Study at a glance
| Design | review |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Conscious thought emerges from nonconscious neural decision mechanisms when their representations are reformatted for potential report, not from a unique neural mechanism. |
Abstract
Conscious thought is often treated as a special class of neural processing, distinct from the nonconscious computations that guide most behavior. Here I offer a different perspective, grounded in the neuroscience of decision-making. I argue that conscious thought arises not from a unique mechanism but from a distinctive use of neural representations already engaged in nonconscious thought. Nonconscious thoughts are structured as interrogations that yield provisional intentions-decision-like commitments that guide action or inquiry without entering awareness. Using examples from perceptual decision-making and neurophysiology, I suggest that such thoughts depend on persistent neural representations that encode not only potential actions but the questions that give them meaning. These knowledge states may also preserve source-sensitive structure that supports a minimal experiential organization even when they remain nonconscious. Conscious thought, on this account, emerges when such a state is reformatted for potential report to another mind, or to oneself, recruiting theory of mind and narrative structure and placing its content in a space presumed to be shared. This proposal identifies a tractable bridge from nonconscious decision mechanisms to phenomenal consciousness, thereby placing part of the hard problem within empirical reach.