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A Note on Testing for Phenomenal Consciousness

Ken Steiglitz

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6925878

Summary

It is impossible to experimentally prove that another being or machine has private experiences (consciousness). A non-conscious agent can mimic a conscious one, making verification impossible. The proof assumes digital communication due to universal noise and that consciousness requires at least the power of a universal Turing machine.

Study at a glance

Key finding A not-conscious agent can mimic a conscious one, so experimental verification of private experiences is impossible.

Abstract

That we cannot experimentally verify that another being or a machine has private experiences is intuitively obvious. I propose a framework and a set of assumptions that allow us to state this precisely and prove it. The proof is straightforward: A not-conscious agent can mimic a conscious one. I rely on the presence of noise in the universe (so that communication can be assumed digital), and the key assumption that to be conscious an agent must be at least as powerful as a universal Turing machine.

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