Against Phenomenal Bonding

Summary

Panpsychism claims all fundamental physical entities have consciousness, but faces the combination problem: how micro-experiences combine into macro-experiences like human consciousness. The subject-summing argument says combining subjects is impossible. Goff and Miller proposed a 'phenomenal bonding' relation to explain subject composition. This paper argues that phenomenal bonding fails to adequately solve the subject-summing argument.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is possessed by all fundamental physical entities, faces an important challenge in the form of the combination problem: how do experiences of microphysical entities combine or give rise to the experiences of macrophysical entities such as human beings? An especially troubling aspect of the combination problem is the subject-summing argument, according to which the combination of subjects is not possible. In response to this argument, Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) have proposed the phenomenal bonding relation, using which they seek to explain the composition of subjects. In this paper, I discuss the merits of the phenomenal bonding solution and argue that it fails to respond satisfactorily to the subject-summing argument.

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