A Mind Cannot Be Smeared Across Time
Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series May 18, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1609/aaaiss.v8i1.42545 via OpenAlex
Summary
A conscious experience feels unified and simultaneous, but most artificial systems process information sequentially. This difference is critical: a system can realize all the ingredients of experience across time without ever instantiating the experienced conjunction itself. Two positions are distinguished: Chord requires objective co-instantiation of the grounded conjunction within a time window, while Arpeggio only requires ingredients to occur within the window. Neurophysiological evidence suggests consciousness depends on phase synchrony and effective connectivity. Under Chord, software consciousness on strictly sequential substrates is impossible for contents requiring two or more simultaneous contributors.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical analysis |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Under the Chord postulate, software consciousness on strictly sequential substrates is impossible for contents whose grounding requires two or more simultaneous contributors. |
Abstract
Whether machines can be conscious depends not only on what they compute, but when they compute it. Most deployed artificial systems realise their functions via sequential or time-multiplexed updates, yet a moment of conscious experience feels unified and simultaneous. I prove that this difference matters. I augment Stack Theory with algebraic laws relating within time-window constraint satisfaction to conjunction. I introduce a temporal semantics over windowed trajectories and prove that existential temporal realisation does not preserve conjunction. A system can realise all the ingredients of experience across time without ever instantiating the experienced conjunction itself. I then distinguish two postulates, Chord and Arpeggio. Chord is the position that conscious unity requires objective co-instantiation of the grounded conjunction within the window, like a musical chord. Arpeggio only needs the ingredients to occur within window, like a melody. I formalise concurrency-capacity to measure what is needed to satisfy co-instantiation. Finally, I review neurophysiological evidence suggesting that consciousness depends on phase synchrony and effective connectivity, and that loss of consciousness is associated with its breakdown. Under Chord, software consciousness on strictly sequential substrates is impossible for contents whose grounding requires two or more simultaneous contributors. The hardware matters.