Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology
Phenomenology and Mind November 1, 2019 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-23625 via DOAJ
Summary
The enactive theory of color holds that color is neither purely subjective nor purely objective, but arises through the interaction between perceiver and environment. This view aligns with Husserl's phenomenology, which also rejects a strict subject-object divide, arguing that both are co-constituted in experience. Extending this account to sensory qualities in general, the paper outlines an enactive phenomenology and ontology that reframes the status of qualia.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The enactive theory of color, which implies color relationism, offers a better alternative to color subjectivism and objectivism by co-constituting subject and object in experience. |
Abstract
In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology.