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The Referential Process, Consciousness, and the Sense of Self

W. Bucci

Emotional Communication and Therapeutic Change December 15, 2002 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1080/07351692209349017 via Semantic Scholar

Summary

The paper connects multiple code theory and the referential process with Damasio's neuropsychological work on consciousness and self. It argues that the interplay of subsymbolic and symbolic systems in working memory, central to the referential process, underlies both consciousness and the sense of self. Pathology originates in dissociation within emotion schemas, which applies across neuroses. Psychoanalytic treatment aims to integrate dissociated schemas by activating subsymbolic, bodily experiences in sessions alongside symbolic representations. Implications for repression, resistance, and therapeutic change are discussed.

Study at a glance

Design theoretical or philosophical paper
Key finding Pathology arises from dissociation within emotion schemas, and psychoanalytic treatment integrates these schemas by activating subsymbolic bodily experience with symbolic representations.

Abstract

The concepts of multiple code theory and the referential process are examined in relation to levels of awareness and the sense of self as characterized in recent work in neuropsychology by Damasio. The juxtaposition of subsymbolic and symbolic systems in working memory, as this operates in the referential process, is central to both consciousness and the sense of self. The roots of pathology lie in dissociation within emotion schemas; this applies at different levels for all forms of neurosis. The goal of psychoanalytic treatment is integration of dissociated schemas; this requires activation of subsymbolic, including bodily experience, in the session itself, in relation to symbolic representations of present and past experience. Implications concerning repression, resistance, the primary process, the role of language in therapeutic change, and other psychoanalytic concepts are discussed.

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