Self-disorders in schizophrenia as disorders of transparency: an exploratory account

Summary

Phenomenological research often views self-disorders in schizophrenia as disturbances of a basic 'minimal self'. This paper challenges that view, noting problems with assuming a universal minimal self and the presence of heightened self-experience in schizophrenia. It explores a 'transparency-view' of consciousness as an alternative, suggesting it can account for loss-of-self, hyper-reflexivity, and increased sense of self. The authors discuss potential advantages of this view for research and clinical practice.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Understanding alterations of selfhood (termed self-disorders or self-disturbances) that are considered typical of the schizophrenia-spectrum is a central focus of phenomenological research. The currently most influential way of phenomenologically conceiving self-disorders in schizophrenia is as disorders of the so-called most basic or ‘minimal self’. In this paper, we first highlight some challenges for the minimal self-view of self-disorders, focusing on (1) problems arising from the supposedly ‘essential’ or ‘universal’ nature of minimal self with respect to phenomenal awareness and (2) the critical implications of alterations of self-experience in schizophrenia that involve heightened or exaggerated sense of self. In the second part, we tentatively explore how a (non-egological) transparency-view of consciousness may offer an alternative way of understanding the experiential abnormalities involved in self-disorders in schizophrenia. We discuss how such a transparency-view (1) may account for loss-of-self experiences; (2) is compatible with the key notion of ‘hyper-reflexivity’; and (3) can help explain instances of self-disorder involving increased sense of self. In conclusion, we consider some possible advantages of this alternative view for research on self-disorders and clinical approaches.

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