Against the Explanatory Argument for Enactivism

Summary

Sensorimotor enactivism claims that perceptual experience is shaped by implicit knowledge of how movement alters sensory input. Proponents argue this view uniquely explains why certain physical brain states produce specific experiences, closing an 'explanatory gap' that rival theories cannot. This paper argues that the term 'material realizer' is ambiguous: narrowly defined, enactivism cannot bridge the gap; broadly defined, it fares no better than other theories of consciousness. Thus, enactivism does not offer superior explanatory power over traditional accounts.

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Abstract

Sensorimotor enactivism is the view that the content and the sensory modality of perceptual experience are determined by implicit knowledge of lawful regularities between bodily movements and patterns of sensory stimulation. A proponent of the explanatory argument for sensorimotor enactivism holds that this view is able to provide an intelligible explanation for why certain material realizers give rise to certain perceptual experiences, while rival accounts cannot close this 'explanatory gap'. However, I argue that the notion of the 'material realizer' of perceptual experience is ambiguous. On a narrow construal, the explanatory gap cannot be bridged, not even by enactivism. On a wide construal, enactivism gets a grip on the explanatory gap, but only to the same extent as established theories of consciousness. Thus, on both horns of the dilemma, the explanatory power of enactivism is not superior to more traditional theories of conscious experience.

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