Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies March 31, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.3.180 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Phenomenal consciousness is often thought to be crucial for moral status, especially in animal ethics. However, if materialism about the mind is true, phenomenal consciousness is probably not especially normatively significant. We should therefore move toward an ethics that does not rely on sentience.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | If materialism about the mind is true, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant, so ethics should move away from relying on sentience. |
Abstract
Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethics without sentience.