Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion
Review of Philosophy and Psychology April 1, 2021 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00537-6 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Illusionism argues that phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, qualitative feel of experience—is an introspective illusion. This paper proposes a theory to explain why we are so strongly disposed to mistakenly judge that we are phenomenally conscious. Three hypotheses—introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—account for how introspection leads to erroneous unconscious inferences about sensory states. The theory also explains common intuitions about consciousness, such as that experiences are private, non-physical, and ineffable, and addresses why illusionism itself seems especially counterintuitive.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Three hypotheses about the mind—introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—can explain our disposition to erroneously judge that we are phenomenally conscious, thereby solving the illusion problem. |
Abstract
According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject to the illusion of phenomenal consciousness consists in having this disposition. I explain our ‘problem intuitions’ about consciousness (Chalmers 2018)—that our sensory states bear phenomenal properties that are qualitatively like something with which we are directly acquainted that is ineffable, atomic, intrinsic (non-relational), private, and non-physical. I also address the illusion meta-problem (Kammerer 2019a), which is to explain why illusionism seems especially counterintuitive.