Phenomenal Consciousness: A Critical Analysis of Knowledge Argument, Inverted Spectrum Argument and Conceivability Argument
Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy April 30, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.36348/jaep.2020.v04i04.004 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
The paper argues that phenomenal consciousness cannot be reduced to physical or functional terms. It reviews arguments for a non-reductive explanation, including the inverted spectrum, knowledge, and conceivability arguments, and contends that reductionist approaches fail to account for subjective experience. The debate is framed by two assumptions: reductive-naturalistic objectivism and phenomenal realism.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Phenomenal consciousness is irreducible to physical or functional explanations. |
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of Demystifying and Mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness; this paper will focus on the inverted spectrum argument, knowledge argument, and the conceivability argument.