Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation
February 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9444-0 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
A self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness can avoid problems of misrepresentation by making self-representations contingently infallible—they cannot misrepresent their objects when tokened in a conscious mental state, even though misrepresentation is logically possible. This approach addresses objections raised against higher-order theories. The paper also critiques three other self-representational models, showing they require such infallibility. It argues that contingent infallibility is naturalistically acceptable only if self-representations have neo-Fregean, directly referring indexical content and conscious mental states have a specific ontological structure, drawing on work by Perry and Kaplan.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | A self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness can avoid problems of self-misrepresentation by positing contingent infallibility of self-representations in conscious states, which is naturalistically viable with indexical content and appropriate ontological structure. |
Abstract
In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states.