A Phenomenology of Recognition in Psychosocial Interventions for Psychosis
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology January 1, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1353/ppp.0.a980380 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
This paper combines philosophical concepts of recognition with a first-person, phenomenological perspective on psychosis. Drawing on the work of Axel Honneth and Jessica Benjamin, it describes recognition as an attitude and reciprocal relationship involving bodily and verbal aspects that enable trust. The paper analyzes psychosocial interventions for psychosis, asking how they acknowledge service users' subjective experiences and facilitate mutual recognition. It argues that a recognizing stance toward the lived experience of psychosis has therapeutic and social potential, emphasizing the importance of the therapeutic relationship.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | A recognizing normative stance toward the lived experience of psychosis has therapeutic and social potential, and the therapeutic relationship is important in psychosocial interventions. |
Abstract
The concept of recognition has recently been introduced into the philosophy of psychiatry, particularly through Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed, to discuss the demand for recognition by mental health activists. This paper complements this perspective with a first-person approach, that is, a phenomenological perspective on recognition using the example of psychosocial interventions for psychosis. For this purpose, the normative concept of recognition is introduced, based on the work of Axel Honneth and Jessica Benjamin. It is described as an attitude and form of reciprocal relationship in which intercorporeal and verbal aspects are central, enabling trust in the social world. The paper then introduces a phenomenological understanding of psychosis with its alterations in the experience of self, world, and other. The subsequent analysis of contemporary psychosocial interventions for psychosis is guided by two fundamental inquiries. First, to show the extent in which these interventions embody a normative stance that acknowledges the subjective and meaningful experiences of service users. Second, how these interventions facilitate mutual and relational recognition. The present paper demonstrates the therapeutic and social potential of a recognizing normative stance toward the lived experience of psychosis. Additionally, it underscores the importance of a therapeutic relationship in psychosocial interventions for psychosis.