Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion

Summary

Delusions of thought insertion, where patients feel external agents place thoughts into their minds, involve loss of mental privacy and a physical quality. The dominant cognitive science view explains this as a missing sense of agency for one's own thoughts, leading to their externalization. This paper argues that view neglects two key aspects: the multimodal nature of thinking in psychosis and the deeply social dimension of delusions in schizophrenia. A broader phenomenological characterization is offered, linking to social perception research and clinical practice.

Study at a glance

Abstract

ABSTRACT Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of a sense of agency for certain thoughts would lead to their externalization, this explaining the general structure of the clinical reports. In this paper, I problematize the phenomenological picture of everyday thoughts that the standard approach adopts when trying to make sense of TI. I claim that the standard approach neglects two more fundamental aspects of TI, namely the multimodal nature of thinking in psychosis and the deeply social dimension of the phenomenology of delusions in schizophrenia. After this, a broader descriptive phenomenological characterization of TI is provided. Finally, I establish some connections between the characterization of TI developed here and current research in social perception and clinical practice.

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