Mysticism and Early Analytic Philosophy
Warszawskie studia teologiczne September 27, 2021 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.30439/wst.2021.1.7 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Early analytic philosophy, despite its reputation for logical rigor, engaged seriously with mysticism. Using Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein as examples, this paper argues that Russell's application of logic to philosophy was driven by a mystical desire to know the world sub specie aeternitatis. Wittgenstein's early work distinguishes between what can be said and what can only be shown, with the latter constituting the mystical realm. The paper traces the roots of this interest in mysticism within analytic philosophy.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Early analytic philosophy, exemplified by Russell and Wittgenstein, was interested in mysticism, with Russell's logical methods rooted in a mystical striving to know the world as it is, and Wittgenstein's philosophy identifying the mystical as what can only be shown. |
Abstract
Early analytic philosophy is known for its logical rigor that seems to leave no place for non-rational sources of knowledge such as mystical experiences. The following paper shows on the example of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein that despite of this early analytic philosophy was interested in mysticism and it also shows the roots of this interest. For Russell an application of logical methods to solving philosophical puzzled was an expression of a more fundamental striving – to know the world as it is, sub specie aeternitatis – which is mystical in nature. In turn early Wittgenstein’s philosophy sets the limits of meaningful propositions and provides the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown and what manifests itself in the world. The latter belongs to the realm of the mystical.