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Bridging the two cultures or re-rectifying incommensurability? A commentary on Ariel Gluklich’s The Joy of Religion

A. Petersen

April 3, 2021 DOI: 10.1080/2153599x.2021.1881606 via Semantic Scholar

Summary

A review of Ariel Glucklich's *The Joy of Religion* (2020) argues that the book's attempt to bridge scientific approaches (cognitive science, evolutionary biology, psychology) with philosophical phenomenology ultimately fails. The author grants pleasure as a biological fact but claims science cannot fully grasp religious experience, elevating phenomenology over science. This creates an incommensurable divide and an apologetic tenor, reasserting the dichotomy between explanation and interpretation. The argument is challenging and original but ultimately unsatisfactory.

Study at a glance

Design theoretical or philosophical paper
Key finding Glucklich's attempt to combine scientific and phenomenological approaches to religious joy is unsatisfactory because it elevates phenomenology at the cost of science, reasserting a dichotomy between explanation and interpretation.

Abstract

Ariel Gluklich takes up an important and according to him partly overlooked topic in The Joy of Religion (2020). The book has many qualities, and much of its argument is challenging, original, and thoughtful. It attends to pleasure and joy in an imbalanced fashion, but there is a reason. While the former is usually culturally excoriated, the latter is eulogized, but howdoes that relate to their biological counterparts? Is it in cultural representations only that we bifurcate happiness into negative and positive sides, or do they, also at the biotic level, trigger differently valenced behaviors and effects? Gluklich admirably seeks to tie together a science-based approach with cultural studies applied to the question how does the emotional, instinctual level connect to feelings of pleasure and joy. Ambitious as the book is, in the end I find the argument unsatisfactory. The attempt to establish a dialogue between the two cultures falters on the grounds that Glucklich’s embrace of a philosophical phenomenological tradition ultimately disqualifies the scientific contribution. The use of cognitive science, evolutionary biology and psychology are obvious in a study of religious joy, as is the attempt to combine the approach with cultural studies, and Gluklich both wants to have his biscuit and eat it. He grants that pleasure is a biological fact, which can be studied by cognitive science and evolutionary biology and psychology, i.e., as an adaptation for avoidance and approach. As a cultural phenomenon, though, pleasure eludes the scientific perspective. The argument is not outright religious, as one may be tempted to think, but it has an apologetic tenor in the dismissal of science for a full grasp of religious experience. It ends up in re-rectifying the time-honored dichotomy between explanation and interpretation. I do not mean to suggest that this is a full rejection, however. There is much to learn; but the attempt to bridge scientific theorizing with philosophical phenomenology does not persuade because of the incommensurability between the two and the elevation of phenomenology at the cost of science. I am also critical about some of the examples adduced from the history of religions, but my focus here is on the overarching argument.

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