Mindfulness Meditation and the Meaning of Life
Mindfulness July 11, 2024 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s12671-024-02404-8 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
A meaningful life requires both subjective engagement and objective value. Mindfulness meditation, as understood in Buddhism, can meet the objective-value requirement because it is a non-subjectively valuable activity necessary for exploring objective meaning and engaging in objectively valuable projects. This resolves a worry in Susan Wolf's philosophical account of meaningfulness, where she seeks standards for securing objective value.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Mindfulness meditation is a non-subjectively valuable activity that can satisfy the objective-value requirement for a meaningful life in Susan Wolf's framework. |
Abstract
Throughout the history of philosophy, ethics has often been a source of guidance on how to live a meaningful life. Accordingly, when the ethical foundations of mindfulness are considered, an important question arises concerning the role of meditation in providing meaning. The present article proposes a new theoretical route for understanding the links between mindfulness meditation and meaningfulness by employing the terminology of Susan Wolf’s contemporary philosophical account of a meaningful life. It opens by examining the question of what kinds of life-meanings are made available by Buddhist doctrine, considering the two alternatives of a cosmic, human-independent meaning of life versus the subjective meanings that humans give to their individual lives. After surveying current psychological theories that aim to explain the correlation between mindfulness as a trait and meaning in life, all of which see mindfulness as a mediating factor in the production of meaning, I argue that Wolf’s framework offers a promising theoretical basis for clarifying the relationship between mindfulness and meaning in that it explains why mindfulness has a direct bearing on meaning in life. I then show that mindfulness meditation, as understood in Buddhism, can respond to some of the philosophical worries that arise from Wolf’s theory, specifically her concern with the standards for securing the objective value of meaningful activities and projects. My claim is that mindfulness meditation is representative of a broader class of activities that are non-subjectively valuable insofar as they are required for any exploration of objective meaning or standards of values, as well as for engagement in objectively valuable projects and activities.