Theory of Liberation: A Comparison between the Advaita Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya
NBPA Journal for Arts, Humanities & Social Sciences February 18, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.65842/nbpa.v2.i1.001 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
Advaita Vedānta holds that liberation (mokṣa) is realizing blissful Brahman and ending suffering, supported by Upaniṣadic texts. Sāṁkhya attributes bondage to failure to discriminate between Puruṣa (consciousness) and Prakṛti (matter), with liberation through discriminative knowledge. Both systems agree liberation comes through knowledge, not action, and recognize jīvanmukti and videhamukti. This paper critically examines internal inconsistencies in Sāṁkhya theory in light of these doctrines.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
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Abstract
According to the Advaita Vedānta, liberation (mokṣa) is the realization of blissful Brahman and the complete cessation of suffering. This view is supported by the Upaniṣadic declarations, such as in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (3.2.9), which states that the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman itself, and the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (7.2.3), which affirms that the knower of the Self transcends grief. In contrast, the Sāṁkhya system attributes bondage to avivekajñāna, or the failure to discriminate between Puruṣa (consciousness) and Prakṛti (matter). Liberation is thus attained through vivekajñāna, the discriminative knowledge of these two ultimate realities. Sāṁkhya further holds that embodiment is the source of threefold suffering, making worldly existence synonymous with bondage. Liberation becomes possible only through the permanent cessation of such suffering, achieved by knowledge of vyākta, avyākta, and jña. While Advaita posits a single ultimate reality—Brahman—Sāṁkhya accepts dual realities in Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Both systems agree that liberation is not attained through action but through knowledge, and both recognize jīvanmukti and videhamukti. Moreover, while sakāma karma binds the individual, niṣkāma karma is compatible with liberating knowledge. This paper critically examines the internal inconsistencies within the Sāṁkhya theory in light of these doctrines.