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Prakāśa. A few reflections on the Advaitic understanding of consciousness as presence and its relevance for philosophy of mind

Wolfgang Fasching

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences August 14, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s11097-020-09690-2 via Semantic Scholar

Summary

For Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is not itself an object of awareness but is the very manifestation of all contents of awareness. This paper argues that modern philosophy of mind mistakenly treats consciousness as a special kind of object (qualia), making the anti-materialist position vulnerable to a materialist reply that the difference is merely epistemological. The paper contends that this reply leads to circularity or infinite regress regarding the nature of givenness or manifestation itself.

Study at a glance

Design theoretical or philosophical paper
Key finding Treating consciousness as an object (qualia) allows materialists to reduce the difference to epistemology, but this move results in circularity or infinite regress with respect to consciousness as manifestation itself.

Abstract

For Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is to be distinguished from all contents of consciousness that might be introspectively detectable: It is precisely consciousness of whatever contents it is conscious of and not itself one of these contents. Its only nature is, Advaita holds, prakāśa (manifestation); in itself it is devoid of any content or structure and can never become an object. This paper elaborates on this kind of understanding of consciousness in order to next explain why it might be fruitful for developing a clear understanding of the nature of the so-called problem of consciousness. Today’s philosophy of mind tends to conceive of consciousness in terms of qualia, thereby taking it as a special kind of (introspectively accessible) object. This renders the antimaterialist claim of the distinctness of consciousness from all physical (publicly accessible) features vulnerable to the materialist reply that the difference in question might be a merely epistemological matter, i.e., a matter of different modes of givenness without difference in what is thus given. This move, however – this paper argues –, is impossible without resulting in circularity or infinite regress with regard to consciousness in the sense of givenness (manifestation) itself.

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