Śaṅkara’s philosophy of dreaming: Constructing an unreal world
Asian Philosophy September 12, 2022 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2022.2120675 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
This article examines how the Indian philosopher Śaṅkara uses dreaming in Advaita Vedānta to explore consciousness and nonduality. Dreaming serves as a direct inquiry into mind and as an illustration: during dreams, unreal objects appear real yet do not exist apart from the mind. Similarly, waking objects are ultimately consciousness alone and not independently real. The article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual's cognitive construction of the waking world is epistemological, not an external ontological power like a creator deity, though distinctions between individual and īśvara become meaningless from the standpoint of nondual brahman.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Śaṅkara uses dreaming to show that the waking world's reality is epistemologically constructed by the individual, not ontologically created by a deity, and that distinctions between individual and īśvara dissolve in nondual brahman. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT This article analyzes Śaṅkara’s use of dreaming in Advaita Vedānta. For Śaṅkara, dreaming functions philosophically as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness. Dreaming also functions as a syllogistic illustration. While dreaming, we experience unreal objects that do not exist apart from our minds. Dreaming thus illustrates the waking world’s nonrealism despite perceiving it as real, and that waking objects are consciousness alone. However, the dream illustration raises several questions: In what ways does illusory dream reality extend to waking objects? And does Śaṅkara view the objective waking world as the individual’s cognitive construction similar to the dream, or as īśvara’s cosmological construction? This article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual’s waking cognitive construction is primarily epistemological rather than an external ontological power akin to a creator deity; however, distinctions between individual and īśvara are ultimately indeterminable and lose meaning from the standpoint of nondual brahman.