Phenomenology and phenomenalism: a comment on Chan and Chen’s “physical nature lives!”
Asian Journal of Philosophy June 18, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00419-7 via Springer Nature
Summary
This commentary argues that Chan and Chen's defense of compatibility between phenomenology and naturalism involves a shift in the meaning of experience, which can be understood as addressing a phenomenalist version of the Argument from Sparse Bundles. Drawing on Husserl's work, it contends that phenomenology does not lead to phenomenalism because perceptual experience is directly directed toward objects, not sensory data. The commentary aims to strengthen, not challenge, the target article's central argument.
Study at a glance
| Design | commentary |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Phenomenology does not lead to phenomenalism because perceptual experience is directly directed toward objects rather than sensory data. |
Abstract
This commentary examines Chan and Chen’s ( 2025 ) argument for the compatibility between phenomenology and naturalism, focusing on their response to the Argument from Sparse Bundles. It argues that the target article involves a shift in the meaning of experience, but that this shift can be understood as an interpretation of a specifically phenomenalist version of ASB. Drawing on Husserl’s own text, the commentary further argues that phenomenology does not lead to phenomenalism, since perceptual experience is directly directed toward objects rather than sensory data. Its aim is therefore to strengthen, rather than challenge, the target article’s central argument.