‘Phenomenology’ is Blue: The Synaesthetic Dynamics of Being-in-the-World
Human Studies June 1, 2026 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1007/s10746-025-09829-7 via Springer Nature
Summary
Synaesthesia, where a stimulus in one sense triggers an additional sensation in another, is hard to explain and challenges embodied theories of cognition. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's claim that synaesthetic perception is normal, this paper argues that synaesthesia and embodied sense-making illuminate each other. Unlike Heidegger's broken hammer, synaesthesia is not a breakdown but an illuminating disruption, like Cézanne's art, disclosing key dynamics of Being-in-the-world. Examining synaesthetic dynamics—a 'difference in union' that preserves distinctions—in motivation, temporality, and intersubjectivity enriches understanding of both general Being-in-the-world and synaesthesia itself.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Synaesthesia functions as an illuminating disruption that discloses, enacts, and amplifies key dynamics of embodied sense-making and Being-in-the-world, rather than as a breakdown of practical engagement. |
Abstract
Synaesthesia, in which particular perceptual or cognitive stimuli trigger anomalous secondary sensations, has proven to be remarkably difficult to explain. The way it complicates linkages between perception and action is often taken to present a particularly interesting challenge for embodied accounts of cognition. Taking up Merleau-Ponty’s startling claim that “synaesthetic perception is the rule,” (2005 [1945]: 266), this paper will suggest that synaesthesia and the dynamics of embodied sense-making can shed light on each other precisely because the former’s puzzling strangeness reminds us just how complex the latter can be. Synaesthesia is the kind of illuminating disruption that is well-known within the phenomenological tradition. Unlike Heidegger’s broken hammer, however, it is not a case of practical engagement gone awry; instead, it functions more like the work of Cézanne as analysed in Merleau-Ponty’s essays, capable of disclosing, enacting, and amplifying key dynamics of our Being-in-the-world. Examining how these synaesthetic dynamics – especially the ‘difference in union’ of embodied sense-making, a synthesis that preserves distinctions – operate in the structures of motivation, temporality, and intersubjectivity can help enrich our understanding of, both, our Being-in-the-world in general and the phenomenon that we ordinarily call ‘synaesthesia’.