Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?
Theoria August 16, 2014 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.1387/theoria.640 via DOAJ
Summary
Thinking has its own distinctive feeling that cannot be reduced to sensory experience. Drawing on Husserl's theory of intentionality, the paper argues that at least some thinking mental states possess a unique phenomenal character. The case of understanding is presented as a key example using the phenomenal contrast argument, and the argument is defended against two objections.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | There is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states that cannot be reduced to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. |
Abstract
In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.