Computational neurophenomenology meets MuSe : A Commentary on Şerife Tekin’s Reclaiming the self in psychiatry

Summary

This commentary argues that computational neurophenomenology can complement Şerife Tekin's MuSe framework for understanding mental distress in relation to the self. By providing mechanistic accounts of the dynamics underlying distinct facets of the self-model, this integration addresses the Freud problem and objectivity challenge. It strengthens the scientific standing of subjective reports in psychiatric research and expands the role of experience-based experts.

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Abstract

Şerife Tekin’s Reclaiming the Self in Psychiatry argues that mental distress and psychiatric disorder are best understood in relation to the self. This kind of approach confronts the Freud problem and the associated objectivity challenge. In this Commentary, I suggest a way of complementing MuSe that helps address both the Freud problem and the associated objectivity challenge. I argue that computational neurophenomenology can be naturally integrated with MuSe by providing mechanistic accounts of the dynamics underlying its distinct facets, articulated in terms of a self-model. This brings several epistemic advantages and may extend MuSe in novel directions. Because subjective experience plays a constitutive methodological role in computational neurophenomenology, this integration also strengthens the scientific standing of subjective reports within MuSe, and expands the role of MuSe’s experience-based experts in psychiatric research.

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