Scientific Method, Complexity and Phenomenology in Human Knowledge

Summary

The classical scientific method, with its deterministic approach, fails to fully capture human complexity. While 20th-century philosophers critiqued this method, their arguments were philosophical, not empirical. This paper argues for a critique grounded in empirical science, using the complexity paradigm, which emphasizes autopoiesis—will, moral choices, and intrinsic motivation. Integrating complexity-based experimental studies with phenomenology offers an adequate framework. The author extends Varela's neurophenomenology concept of 'third person' into a new epistemological model: 'a third person, studying a double first person'.

Study at a glance

Abstract

ABSTRACT The classical scientific method, particularly its deterministic approach, encounters limitations when attempting to fully capture the complexities of human beings. Although many 20th‐century philosophers criticized this method, their arguments were primarily philosophical. I see a need for a critique of the scientific method grounded in empirical science itself. The complexity paradigm offers the most appropriate perspective for this purpose. This paradigm emphasizes the inherent proactivity (‘autopoiesis’ or ‘creation from within’) that manifests through will, moral choices and intrinsic motivation—aspects that are difficult to comprehend using the tools of the scientific method. I argue that integrating complexity‐based experimental studies with phenomenology provides an adequate framework for understanding human beings. To support and exemplify this argument, I draw upon Varela's neurophenomenology concept of ‘third person’ and develop it into a new epistemological model named ‘a third person, studying a double first person’.

Tags