Dynamic Touch as Common Ground for Enactivism and Ecological Psychology.
David Travieso, Lorena Lobo, Carlos De Paz, Thijme E Langelaar, Jorge Ibáñez-gijón, David M Jacobs
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01257 via PubMed
Summary
Enactivism and ecological psychology share more common ground than is often acknowledged. Dynamic touch—touch involving muscles and tendons that enables perception of unseen wielded objects—illustrates this overlap. It necessarily involves active exploration and has been formalized at the level of organism-environment laws. The example provides empirically supported instantiations of sensorimotor contingencies (enactivist terms) and intentional exploration and information detection (ecological terms). Dynamic touch also exemplifies enactivist concepts of bringing-forth the world and sense-making. The article further clarifies ecological concepts of invariance and affordance, distinguishing perceiving from actualizing affordances.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Enactivism and ecological psychology share more commonalities than often recognized, as demonstrated by the example of dynamic touch, which instantiates key concepts from both approaches. |
Abstract
The main purpose of this article is to show that enactivism and ecological psychology share more aspects than is often recognized. Rather than debating about differences, commonalities between the approaches are illustrated with the example of dynamic touch. Dynamic touch is a form of touch that implies muscles and tendons and that allows the perception of hand-held objects that are wielded but not seen. Given that perceivers perform the wielding movements with effort, dynamic touch necessarily implies active exploration. The strength of dynamic touch as an example lies in the fact that it has been formalized and analyzed in detail at the level of the laws that govern the organism-environment system. The example provides empirically supported instantiations of sensorimotor contingencies, in enactivist terms, and of intentional exploration and information detection, in ecological terms. Moreover, dynamic touch is a practical example of the enactivist concepts of bringing-forth the world and sense-making. As a second purpose, we use the example of dynamic touch to clarify key concepts of the ecological approach. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of invariance and affordance, indicating the crucial difference between perceiving and actualizing affordances, and highlighting the importance of these concepts for the dialogue between enactivism and ecological psychology.