Revolution in Mind?
Evolving Enactivism May 19, 2017 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036115.003.0001
Summary
The shift toward enactive, embodied, extended, and ecological (E) approaches in cognitive science challenges classical cognitivism by moving away from representationalism, computationalism, and mechanistic explanation. The chapter explains how various E-approaches differ from cognitivism and argues that the radical enactive cognition (REC) proposal is revolutionary, not merely revisionary. It also defends naturalistic methodology, warning against dismissing REC based on a priori intuitions about cognition's essence.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The E-turn in cognitive science, particularly REC, represents a revolutionary break from cognitivism by rejecting representationalism, computationalism, and mechanistic explanation, and should be evaluated naturalistically rather than by a priori intuitions. |
Abstract
This chapter introduces the E-turn in cognitive science –the move to embrace enactive, embodied, extended and ecological views of cognition–and the empirical and theoretical considerations that spurred it on. It explains how E-approaches differ from classical forms of cognitivism: in particular the degree to which different E-approaches move away from the cognitivist commitments to representationalism, computationalism and mechanistic explanation. Against this backdrop, it becomes clear in which ways REC’s proposal is not just radically revisionary but revolutionary in spirit. The chapter also sets out the basic rules of naturalistic play, reminding the reader why attempts to dismiss REC by appeal to a priori intuitions about what is essential to cognition violate the methodological scruples of naturalism.