Mechanisms of skillful interaction: sensorimotor enactivism & mechanistic explanation

Summary

The mechanistic model explains phenomena by identifying their multi-level organized components, while sensorimotor enactivism describes perceptual experience as a skillful interaction between perceiver and world. Although these approaches could complement each other, two challenges arise: the representation challenge, because mechanistic details of sensorimotor interaction often involve cognitive representations, conflicting with enactivism's nonrepresentational stance; and the reconstitution challenge, where mechanistic explanation may reconceive perceptual experience as entirely organism-bound. The paper explores these tensions and potential solutions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

ABSTRACT The mechanistic model depicts scientific explanations as involving the discovery of multi-level, organized components that constitute a target phenomenon. Meanwhile, sensorimotor enactivism purports to offer a scientifically informed account of perceptual experience as a skill-laden interactive relationship, constitutively involving both perceiver and world, rather than as an agent-bound representation of the world. Insofar as sensorimotor enactivism identifies an empirically tractable phenomenon – skillful agent-world interaction – and mechanistic explanation establishes the subpersonal components of this phenomenon, the two approaches allow for a fruitful division of labor in investigating perceptual experience. On closer inspection, however, two challenges arise. First, the “representation challenge” arises because promising attempts to set out implementational details of our sensorimotor interaction with the world implicate cognitive representations, creating tension with sensorimotor enactivism’s nonrepresentational commitments. Second, the “reconstitution challenge” arises when mechanistic explanation not only uncovers the components of some established phenomenon but plays a role in “reconstituting” this phenomenon. This means that, through investigating mechanisms, perceptual experience may be reconceived such that its constituents are wholly organism-bound. We explore both challenges to the compatibility of mechanism and sensorimotor enactivism and examine possible solutions. The result is a clearer understanding of the tensions and opportunities for learning between the frameworks.

Tags