Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership

Summary

The sense of ownership—the feeling that one's body and experiences belong to oneself—is defended as part of a minimal sense of self against critics who want to dismiss or eliminate it. The phenomenological account is itself deflationary because it treats this sense as implicit in experience and bodily action, not as an extra feeling. Empirical evidence for pre-reflective self-awareness supports the concept, and an enactivist view of embodied cognition shows how the sense of ownership plays a positive role in action.

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Abstract

I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.

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