Building and Understanding the Minimal Self.
Frontiers in psychology January 1, 2021 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.716982 via PubMed
Summary
Two approaches to studying the minimal self—cognitive science and cognitive robotics—pursue different goals: cognitive science builds abstract models that predict human experimental data, while cognitive robotics aims to construct embodied machines that develop a self from scratch, like human infants. Although both can produce causal mechanistic models, building a minimal self is not the same as understanding the human minimal self. Caution is needed when drawing conclusions about humans from robotic models or vice versa. Integrating constraints from multiple levels of analysis is essential for models that predict, generate, and causally explain real-world behavior.
Study at a glance
| Design | theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Building a minimal self in robotics is distinct from understanding the human minimal self, so conclusions from robotic models about humans require caution. |
Abstract
Within the methodologically diverse interdisciplinary research on the minimal self, we identify two movements with seemingly disparate research agendas - cognitive science and cognitive (developmental) robotics. Cognitive science, on the one hand, devises rather abstract models which can predict and explain human experimental data related to the minimal self. Incorporating the established models of cognitive science and ideas from artificial intelligence, cognitive robotics, on the other hand, aims to build embodied learning machines capable of developing a self "from scratch" similar to human infants. The epistemic promise of the latter approach is that, at some point, robotic models can serve as a testbed for directly investigating the mechanisms that lead to the emergence of the minimal self. While both approaches can be productive for creating causal mechanistic models of the minimal self, we argue that building a minimal self is different from understanding the human minimal self. Thus, one should be cautious when drawing conclusions about the human minimal self based on robotic model implementations and vice versa. We further point out that incorporating constraints arising from different levels of analysis will be crucial for creating models that can predict, generate, and causally explain behavior in the real world.