Prerequisites for an Artificial Self.
Verena V Hafner, Pontus Loviken, Antonio Pico Villalpando, Guido Schillaci
Frontiers in neurorobotics January 1, 2020 Peer reviewed DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2020.00005 via PubMed
Summary
Body ownership and agency are key components of the minimal self, traditionally studied in philosophy but now explored in brain, cognitive, behavioral sciences, and robotics. This review argues that mechanisms for developing motor and cognitive skills in robots also build the foundation for an artificial self. It examines developmental processes of the minimal self in biological systems, transfers those principles to artificial systems, and suggests metrics for agency and body ownership in an artificial self.
Study at a glance
| Design | review |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Mechanisms for developing motor and cognitive skills in robots can build the foundation for an artificial self, with transferable principles from biological minimal self development and suggested metrics for agency and body ownership. |
Abstract
Traditionally investigated in philosophy, body ownership and agency-two main components of the minimal self-have recently gained attention from other disciplines, such as brain, cognitive and behavioral sciences, and even robotics and artificial intelligence. In robotics, intuitive human interaction in natural and dynamic environments becomes more and more important, and requires skills such as self-other distinction and an understanding of agency effects. In a previous review article, we investigated studies on mechanisms for the development of motor and cognitive skills in robots (Schillaci et al., 2016). In this review article, we argue that these mechanisms also build the foundation for an understanding of an artificial self. In particular, we look at developmental processes of the minimal self in biological systems, transfer principles of those to the development of an artificial self, and suggest metrics for agency and body ownership in an artificial self.